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tor, Millstein Center, at the Law School, 
and Co-Director, Richman Center for 
Business, Law & Public Policy. Professor 
Gordon teaches and writes extensively 
on corporate governance, mergers and 
acquisitions, comparative corporate 
governance, and, more recently, the regu-
lation of finance institutions. He is the 
co-author of Principles of Financial Regu-
lation and co-editor of the forthcoming 
Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and 
Governance. 
With that, let’s move to the substan-
tive discussion. Martijn, you have the 
floor first.
Some New Evidence Against 
Shareholder Activists— 
Staggered Boards
Martijn Cremers: Thank you, Marcel. And 
let me start by also thanking the Millstein 
Center and the other organizers of this 
event for this great opportunity to share 
with you my thinking about the future 
academic research agenda. Before I joined 
Notre Dame about four years ago, I spent 
ten years at the Yale School of Manage-
ment. The Millstein Center was founded 
at Yale in 2006 while I was there, and that 
association has been a blessing to me. I 
have fond memories of long conversations 
with Ira in which he would respond to my 
many—and sometimes not well thought-
out—questions with unfailing courtesy 
and insight. 
With respect to today’s subject of 
academic research into corporate gover-
nance, let me start by saying that I think 
we have to change the way that we have 
been answering the main question: What’s 
the biggest challenge for the board and the 
shareholders? Almost all academic work 
on corporate governance for the past 30 
academic research greater than ever. The 
complexity of the world and the chal-
lenges that confront investors, boards, 
management, regulators, and policy 
makers on a daily basis mean that their 
decisions need to be informed by rigorous 
data, judgment, and breadth of experience 
and perspective.
At this 2016 Millstein Governance 
Forum, we are celebrating ten years of 
the Millstein Center. In that spirit, we are 
looking forward to the next ten years. In 
this panel, we will be exploring the current 
thinking and emerging lines of research of 
three leading law and economics scholars 
with the hope of generating a dialogue 
about a corporate governance research 
agenda for the academy going forward.
So, with that as prologue, let me briefly 
introduce each of our three distinguished 
panelists in the order they will be speaking: 
Martijn Cremers is the Professor of 
Finance at Mendoza College of Business 
at the University of Notre Dame and has 
a long and rich history with the Millstein 
Center. Professor Cremer’s recent work 
has focused on staggered boards, and he 
is also known for his work on “Active 
Share,” which measures the percentage of 
fund holdings that is different from the 
benchmark holdings.
Vik Khanna is the William W. Cook 
Professor of Law at the University of 
Michigan Law School. Professor Khanna’s 
scholarship looks at corporate law, securi-
ties law and white collar crime in the US 
and law and legal issues in India. He serves 
as co-director of the Joint Centre for 
Global Corporate and Financial Law & 
Policy, a collaboration between Michigan 
Law and India’s Jindal Global Law School.
And Jeff Gordon is the Richard Paul 
Richman Professor of Law, Faculty Direc-
Marcel Bucsescu: Good morning, and 
welcome to this discussion of academic 
research on corporate governance. I’m 
Marcel Bucsescu, Executive Director of 
the Millstein Center here at Columbia 
Law School, and I’m going to serve as 
moderator. 
In some ways, the study of corporate 
governance as an academic discipline is 
relatively new. Many governance schol-
ars view Berle and Means’ much-cited 
1932 book, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property, as the foundational cor-
porate governance study. And by far the 
most cited successor to Berle and Means is 
Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 article that set 
out the principles and implications of the 
theory of “agency costs” that has played 
such a central role in the corporate finance 
and governance literature.
 The field experienced a new burst of 
energy following the Enron and World-
Com financial reporting scandals in the 
early 2000s. And here we are, nearly two 
decades later, and corporate governance 
research has matured significantly. Yet 
many practitioners continue to comment 
on the disconnect between theory and 
practice, between the questions researched 
and the questions that need to be 
answered. Academic work in the gover-
nance arena has come to rely heavily on 
empirical studies. But if these studies have 
provided useful insights into past events, 
practitioners have generally found them 
lacking in the practical judgment and 
experience that is required to help inform 
real world decision-making. And so aca-
demic work is often discounted as lacking 
relevance or applicability.
But the environment that public com-
panies and the capital markets now face 
may be making the demand for robust 
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papers, one in the Stanford Law Review 
and one in the Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, that look at these commitment 
devices in great detail.1
The consensus among academics 
has been that staggered boards are bad 
for shareholders—a consensus that has 
been supported by research using data 
from 1990 to 2005, a period when board 
structure was very stable. But we have 
found a lot more data to reexamine this 
view. With very generous support from 
the Millstein Center and some other 
sponsors, we went back all the way to the 
1970s when staggered boards were very 
uncommon. Most U.S. company “stag-
gered” up during the mid-1980s; and then 
many of them “staggered” down during 
the mid-2000s in response to shareholder 
activism of various kinds. And when we 
looked at the stock performance of these 
companies during these two different 
periods, we found—somewhat to our 
surprise—that their performance actually 
improved after the companies staggered 
up, and their performance suffered after 
they staggered down. 
These findings provide support for two 
observations that Ira made earlier today. 
First, based on his experience, most direc-
tors want to do the right thing by their 
companies and their shareholders. But 
that, of course, is precisely the opposite 
of the working premise of most academic 
research about directors, which assumes 
that they need strong incentives and 
market deterrents to restrain them from 
pursuing their own self-interest. Second, 
Ira believes that directors need “elbow 
room” to perform their jobs well; that is, 
they need to have more discretion, as well 
as more courage, when making difficult 
decisions to resist shortsighted share-
Getting all of a company’s major 
stakeholders, including its shareholders, 
to commit to cooperate in creating long-
term value is a difficult collective action 
problem. It cannot be managed entirely 
through explicit contracting, for various 
reasons. One challenge is asymmetric 
information. Another is that many stake-
holders, particularly corporate managers 
and employees, have to make firm-specific 
investments that are much more valuable 
when their ongoing relationship with the 
firm can be assumed to be long-lasting 
than when that relationship is subject 
to change or disruption by, say, a hostile 
takeover. There are important mutual 
dependencies in these long-term relation-
ships; to cooperate over the long-term, a 
company’s stakeholders need to be able to 
trust each other. 
 And the crux of the problem, as many 
observers of U.S. markets and governance 
see it, is that many shareholders may actu-
ally have the weakest commitments to 
long-term cooperation with other stake-
holders because they can so easily exit 
the relationship—in fact, just by selling 
their shares. In this sense, today’s typi-
cal institutional shareholder has the least 
commitment to cooperate in creating 
long-term value among all the major cor-
porate stakeholders. So, we need to think 
about developing or making greater use of 
commitment devices or mechanisms that 
help ensure that corporate managements 
and boards feel more confident when tak-
ing what they believe to be the long-term 
value-maximizing courses of action.
Two such commitment devices are the 
use of staggered boards and super major-
ity shareholder voting requirements to 
approve major changes in the firm. My 
co-authors and I recently published two 
or 40 years has been based on the assump-
tion that the most important corporate 
governance problem is the one identified 
by Jensen and Meckling in their seminal 
1976 paper that Marcel just mentioned. 
And that problem, or challenge, is how 
to minimize the so-called “agency costs” 
that shareholders bear in monitoring and 
providing effective incentives for corpo-
rate executives to maximize the long-run 
value of the firm. Chief among these costs 
are excessive compensation—at least given 
the performance of the firm—and the loss 
of value associated with empire building, 
managerial entrenchment, and other 
forms of self-dealing.
The basic insight underlying this 
model is that markets don’t work well 
within corporations, presumably because 
shareholders don’t have enough informa-
tion and influence on corporate boards to 
ensure that those boards do a good job 
of representing their interests. And the 
conventional solution to this agency cost 
problem is to try to make market disci-
pline work better, by encouraging active 
takeover markets and improving the 
design of incentive pay. 
So, again, this is the traditional corpo-
rate governance challenge that is addressed 
by most academic research—limiting the 
costs associated with the moral hazards 
facing self-interested and entrenched top 
executives and directors. But, consistent 
with all the concern that has been expressed 
by Ira and many others about corporate 
“short-termism,” I’m going to argue that 
there may be another major corporate 
governance challenge, one that may well 
be both more difficult and more impor-
tant than limiting agency costs—and that 
is what I refer to as “inadequate shareholder 
commitment to long-term cooperation.” 
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We need to think about developing or making 
greater use of commitment devices or 
mechanisms that help ensure that corporate 
managements and boards feel more confident 
when taking what they believe to be the long-
term value-maximizing courses of action.
Martijn Cremers
research. First, how long do institutions 
hold their positions? In another paper 
forthcoming in the Journal of Financial 
Economics, I looked at data from form 
13Fs, which U.S. institutional investors 
have to file with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, going back to the 
1980s. I reached the conclusion that the 
holding periods of the large institutional 
investors in the United States have been 
fairly stable over the last 40 years.3 What 
this tells us is that the huge increases in 
trading in recent years have not been 
attributable to these institutional investors 
who now own about 80% of U.S. stocks. 
Rather, it has been the high-frequency 
traders, not the large institutions like 
investment advisors and pension funds, 
which have generated the high trading 
volumes. Institutional investors’ holding 
periods have, as I said, remained fairly 
stable, and may even have increased a bit.
But that said, it is still very uncommon 
for institutions to hold stocks, on average, 
for longer than two years or three years. It 
was uncommon in the 1980s, and it is still 
very uncommon now. So if by “long-term 
holder” you mean an investor who holds 
more than three years, then not many 
investors qualify. There has also been 
a huge trend towards indexing, but my 
research shows that that trend has been 
holder proposals as well as shortsighted 
management strategies designed to sat-
isfy short-term investors. The hypothesis 
underlying my recent studies is that per-
haps the staggering of boards can help 
lengthen the decision-making horizon 
of boards and the managers they oversee. 
Staggering the board has the potential to 
free the typical director from excessive 
concern about being forced to step down 
by shareholders who are too focused on 
the next quarter’s earnings.
One contributor to this concern is the 
recent shareholder rights project at Har-
vard Law School, which has mounted an 
aggressive campaign to de-stagger boards. 
That campaign alone has been largely 
responsible for a significant increase in 
board declassifications in recent years. In 
our new study that we have provisionally 
called “Boards Declassification Activism,” 
we have done a kind of post-mortem on 
what actually happened to those compa-
nies that declassified their boards after 
being targeted by the shareholder rights 
project.2 And much as we found in our 
study of earlier destaggerings, the com-
panies targeted by the Harvard Law 
Shareholder Rights project underper-
formed after their declassifications. 
Before I close, let me also mention two 
other questions addressed in my recent 
going on for quite some time. 
What’s more, many institutional inves-
tors who are not explicit index funds have 
been “closet” index funds for a long time, 
meaning that they have substantial over-
lapping holdings with the benchmark 
indices. For example, if both the institu-
tion and the market have a 3% stake in 
Apple, then whatever happens to Apple’s 
share price will affect the fund and the 
market identically. So the fund, in a 
relative sense, has what amounts to an 
indexed position—and thus little motive 
to become an active monitor of perfor-
mance. And I think this may be important 
because when you aggregate all the institu-
tional holdings by institution—so let’s say 
all Fidelity funds represent one portfolio, 
all of Vanguard makes up another, and all 
of BlackRock is a third, and so forth—you 
find that the percentage of assets in the 
hands of what I think of as largely passive 
investors has increased from about 50% in 
1985 to as much as 80% today.
So, viewed in this way, then, passive 
index investing is not something new. It’s 
an old issue for corporate governance. If 
institutional investors have relatively little 
economic stake in the decisions made by a 
particular company, it is difficult for them 
to make a commitment to long-term value 
creation. 
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of their profits on CSR, the companies 
also have the option of issuing a statement 
that explains why they have decided not to 
comply with the rule. It is, in this sense, a 
kind of a “soft” mandate, and the comply-
or-explain provision provides companies 
with an out if they really think that such 
spending would hurt the company.
 How many companies does the rule 
actually affect? There are roughly 2,000 
listed companies in India with net prof-
its above the threshold, which is roughly 
$750,000. And that is about half of the 
listed companies. If the company has prof-
its above the $750,000 threshold, they have 
to form a CSR committee with at least one 
independent director whose task is to for-
mulate and monitor a CSR policy to spend 
2% of profits on CSR; or if they choose not 
to spend 2% of profits on CSR, they must 
explain why they have chosen not to.
Now, the Indian government has 
laid out an exceptionally broad array of 
activities that it considers to fall under 
the rubric of legitimate CSR—basically 
anything that can be considered to help 
alleviate poverty. Since there are about half 
a billion poor people in India, there are 
many kinds of spending that would have 
some kind of effect on alleviating poverty. 
The main exception disallowed by the gov-
ernment is spending that is considered to 
benefit firm employees or political parties.
Why did this CSR spending mandate 
develop? It was a relatively late addition 
to the drafting of India’s Companies Act. 
In 2009 the government put forward a 
voluntary guidance on CSR. The govern-
ment was encouraging Indian companies 
to spend money on CSR because the coun-
try had started liberalizing its economy 
in 1991. And although there’s no doubt 
that the economy and many people in 
more about this later. 
But despite the policy makers’ pro-
business intentions, what my colleague and 
I have found in our recent study4 is, perhaps 
not surprisingly, a reduction in corporate 
market values upon the announcement of 
this rule mandating CSR spending. And 
the reduction has been quite large, on the 
order of 3% on average. Our other main 
finding is that, although the general level 
of spending on CSR in India has increased 
dramatically across the board, those compa-
nies that were doing the lion’s share of CSR 
spending before the law came into effect 
have actually reduced their CSR spending, 
which of course was far from the effect 
intended by policymakers.
Now, one question that arises is this: 
in what sense does this particular mandate 
in India amount to a corporate tax, even 
though the government neither collects 
nor redistributes any revenue? And how 
is it different from, and possibly more 
socially constructive than, a tax?
Statements by the policy makers suggest 
that they are relying on private executives’ 
incentives and information to do what is 
normally the government’s job—namely, 
to direct spending on public goods, which 
I find to be an extremely interesting and 
potentially effective approach to dealing 
with this issue. And it raises the last ques-
tion I’m going to address here: Is something 
like this worth considering in the United 
States? And when I say that, I don’t neces-
sarily mean mandating CSR spending, but 
at least finding ways to encourage more of 
it on a voluntary basis. 
As I mentioned earlier, India is the first 
country to require firms above certain 
thresholds to spend some amount of their 
profits on CSR—though what I didn’t 
mention is that, instead of spending 2% 
Bucsescu: Thank you, Martijn. There was 
a lot in there, and so I’m going to move 
along quickly to invite Vik to present his 
work. 
The Case for Mandating CSR:  
The Indian Experiment
Vik Khanna:  Thank you, Marcel. And I 
also want to express my gratitude to the 
organizers for inviting me and to Mr. 
Millstein and the center for your gen-
erous support. I’m going to be talking 
about areas of scholarship that, although 
they have generated tremendous debate 
inside business schools and economics 
departments, are only now beginning to 
attract the interest of law faculties. And 
I’m going to use an interesting example of 
a law that was designed and implemented 
in India as a way to test some propositions 
about why companies have corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) campaigns 
and what might be the best way for gov-
ernments to encourage such programs.
As we all know, there has been a great 
deal of discussion about income inequal-
ity and efforts to remediate such inequality 
through various kinds of gain sharing. It 
turns out that India has adopted a novel 
approach in trying to address this issue. 
India’s 2013 Companies Act mandates that 
all companies that meet certain thresholds 
spend at least 2% of their after-tax profit on 
corporate social responsibility initiatives or 
explain why they did not. This law was the 
first of its kind, and it continues to be the 
only such law in the world.
You are probably wondering, “Why 
did India do this?” It turns out that the 
primary reason was to address concern 
about political backlash against the eco-
nomic liberalization that had been carried 
out since the early 1990s—and I’ll tell you 
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it had benefited greatly from the growth 
that came from that liberalization, there 
remained a perception that some sectors of 
the economy benefited by a lot more than 
others. Many believed, and with some justi-
fication, that income inequality was getting 
much worse. And the government was very 
concerned that a political backlash would 
either slow or even reverse the liberalization 
agenda started 20 years earlier.
To prevent that from happening, they 
pushed companies to voluntarily spend 
money on CSR instead of taxing them 
directly. When governments liberalize their 
economies, they would rather it appear that 
companies are choosing to spend money on 
CSR rather than being coerced into doing 
it. But after about eight months of unsuc-
cessful cajoling, the government became 
frustrated with the Indian business sector; 
and in August of 2010 proposed making 
CSR spending mandatory for companies 
above a certain profit threshold. 
What have been the effects of this 
measure? India has fairly good data on 
financial statements of firms and stock 
prices; and using this data, we found, first 
of all, that companies with profits right 
at the threshold at which the law applies 
experienced a big drop in value on the 
announcement of this new rule. But com-
panies well above this threshold did not 
see much of a decline. And, as one would 
expect, the values of companies well below 
the threshold were largely unaffected. 
So, again, it was mainly just companies 
at the threshold that saw a large drop in 
their values in response to the announce-
ment that they were now going to have to 
spend 2% of their profits on CSR. And as 
I mentioned earlier, the market reaction 
was a negative 3%. 
We also found that this negative effect 
was strongest for companies that do not 
do much advertising. But for those Indian 
companies that spend heavily on advertis-
ing, the mandate had almost no negative 
effect. Our explanation for this difference 
is that the companies that advertise were 
expected to be able to reduce their adver-
tising budget while increasing their CSR 
and so largely maintain their level of oper-
ating cash flow. But companies that do no 
advertising were seen to be likely to have 
more difficulty in offsetting their increased 
CSR spending.
We also found an interesting effect on 
overall CSR spending. We found, first of 
all, a very large uptick in spending on CSR 
in 2014 when the law came into effect. 
Now keep in mind that since this is a 
“comply or explain” rule, Indian compa-
nies don’t have to spend on CSR but just 
issue a statement justifying their decision. 
Before the law was passed in 2010, only 5 
or 6% of Indian companies reported CSR 
spending. In the first year after the law 
went into effect in 2014, 33% of the com-
panies were spending on CSR. That is an 
incredible increase in a country where law 
enforcement is generally not very good, 
and where you have an option to explain 
rather than comply. This result suggests to 
me that the social norms are developing to 
support CSR.
But that said, I don’t want to paint too 
rosy a picture of CSR in India. Let’s take 
a quick look at the CSR spending of the 
top 100 companies in India, for which 
we actually have very good data. What 
we basically find is that before the law, 
in 2013, the firms can be divided among 
those doing less than 2% CSR spend-
ing and those doing more. The ones that 
To test the possibility that such private-sector spend-
ing on public goods could be more cost-effective 
than government spending, we took a closer look 
at the actual CSR spending of Indian companies. 
And what we found is that the companies are basi-
cally spending on social initiatives with a short- to 
medium-term payoff, which we defined as producing 
some deliverable after one to three years. 
Vik Khanna 
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The Private Equity Model for 
Public Companies
Jeff Gordon: Thanks, Marcel, it is a pleasure 
to be here, and it has been great fun to work 
with Ira Millstein on these issues and hear 
the debates. I want to respond to Martijn’s 
observation that the academy has focused 
too heavily on managerial moral hazard, or 
“agency costs,” and not enough on share-
holder commitment and the long term.
Martijn looked at these questions 
through the lens of structural solutions 
such as staggered boards, special voting 
requirements, and maybe even dual-class 
common stock. Although all of these 
structural solutions may have some ben-
efits in extending the time horizons of 
managements and boards, they all face a 
fundamental problem that I call the “lock-
in” issue. Dual-class stock may seem to 
work well now, when companies have lots 
of value-adding growth opportunities. But 
as their founders age and their growth 
opportunities begin to dry up, sharehold-
ers will want to have ways of influencing 
companies to return capital and, in some 
cases, perhaps even replace the founders.
So, my main focus is on a corpo-
rate governance system’s ability to bring 
about changes of direction and control 
when they become necessary—and not 
on addressing Martijn’s long-term, short-
term problem. The monitoring board 
model that was developed by academics 
nearly 50 years ago assumed that direc-
tors would be “outside” directors—people 
who, inevitably, get most of their informa-
tion by looking at the firm’s stock prices, 
year against year and relative to their 
peers’. These people might be described 
as “thinly informed” directors. And I’m 
going to argue that this model of the 
board is really at the core of both the tra-
tors—perhaps even a lower cost of capital, 
and thus higher valuations—from such 
spending. And that, of course, would be 
a real benefit. 
To test the possibility that such private-
sector spending on public goods could 
be more cost-effective than government 
spending, we took a closer look at the actual 
CSR spending of Indian companies. And 
what we found is that the companies are 
basically spending on social initiatives with 
a short- to medium-term payoff, which we 
defined as producing some deliverable after 
one to three years. And they are targeting 
relatively young people. India has roughly 
800 million people, just a massive num-
ber, under the age of 40. Indian companies 
are investing most of their CSR dollars in 
education and healthcare, but mainly in 
short-run fixes. Instead of building hos-
pitals, they buy antibiotics, and mosquito 
net beds to prevent malaria. And they don’t 
invest in K through 12, but rather in one-
year degree or certificate programs.  
Now having told you all this, should 
the U.S. consider enacting something 
like this law? I think a mandatory rule in 
the U.S. might be a bit of a stretch, but a 
voluntary push might actually not meet 
much resistance. Fortune 1,000 compa-
nies in the U.S. already do a substantial 
amount of CSR, and a voluntary push 
might be used effectively to address con-
cerns that the private sector is not giving 
back to society—which, of course, is one 
of the key undercurrents in the ongoing 
inequality debate. I’ll stop there. 
 
Bucsescu: Thanks, Vik. We’re going to 
conclude with Jeff Gordon, who will look 
at public company boards in relation to 
some other board governance models, 
notably that of private equity.
were doing less than 2% increased their 
spending dramatically after the law. But 
the ones that were doing more than 2%—
the “high-quality” firms, so to speak—all 
dropped their spending to 2%; not one of 
them retained their pre-law levels of CSR.
So, there appears to be some substitution 
between CSR spending and advertising. As 
soon as the law came into effect and made 
2% spending mandatory, companies that 
previously spent as much as 5% on CSR 
all dropped to 2%. That is a very puzzling, 
and presumably unintended, effect, one 
that suggests that charity that had been con-
sidered a good thing wasn’t so good once 
the law required it. Prior to passage of the 
law, spending 5% of your profits on CSR 
was a viewed as a very effective signal that 
you were a socially responsible company. 
Now, to maintain such a reputation, you 
might have to spend as much as 10% of 
profits because the baseline has gone from 
zero to two. And in the interviews we did 
with CSR and other executives at these 
firms, that is exactly what they told us. The 
finance people said, “We’re going to have to 
spend much more to get the old effect, but 
we don’t want to do that. We think we have 
better uses for that money.” 
India is a country where people are 
accustomed to various taxes where the 
government decides how to spend the 
money. But in this case, the government 
simply said, “You must spend it. How you 
spend it is up to you.” That suggests that 
this is not a pure tax because they are allow-
ing corporate executives to decide how to 
do the spending. It seems quite plausible 
to me that corporate executives are better 
able to spend the money than the govern-
ment because they have better information 
or maybe better incentives. And their 
companies get goodwill from their inves-
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awry. Management, of course, is going 
to resist this claim, but in many cases for 
reasons that may not necessarily serve 
the long-run interests of their sharehold-
ers. And the institutional investors, who 
collectively are the majority owners of 
most large U.S. companies, understand 
management’s position and incentives. 
Such investors also recognize that board 
members are “thinly informed” and there-
fore cannot be relied upon to evaluate the 
activist’s alternative strategy proposal with 
deep understanding or much objectivity.
And that’s the principle reason why 
activists with a good reputation tend to get 
quite a good hearing from the institutions 
and win their support a fair amount of 
the time. Again, the underlying reason for 
the success of activists is that the boards 
of public companies lack the capacity to 
offer a better-informed choice than the 
one offered by the activist.
What’s more, I would even suggest that 
their favor. Even BlackRock and other asset 
managers who profess to value “steward-
ship” and long-termism are voting for the 
activists 30 to 40% of the time.
So what is going on? Well, let’s start 
with the fact that the institutional inves-
tors who vote with the activists are at 
the same time committing substantial 
amounts of money to PE firms in blind-
pool investments with lock-up periods for 
essentially a decade—which is very much 
the epitome of long-term investing. Are 
the institutional investors being inconsis-
tent? Or could it be that such institutional 
investors have come to appreciate that the 
public firm governance model is deeply 
flawed—and that the PE governance 
model has proven to be quite effective? 
To see the failings of the public com-
pany model more clearly, let’s take a look 
at what activists actually do. The activists 
show up with a thick slide deck, claim-
ing that the firm’s business strategy is 
ditional agency problem and Martijn’s 
short-term horizon and underinvestment 
problem—and for both of these reasons, 
I think the model needs to change. We 
need a model that incorporates what Ira 
Millstein and Bill McCracken have called 
“activist” directors. The rise and success of 
activist hedge funds can be viewed as the 
market’s reaction to the shortcomings of 
the monitoring board model that has been 
the central governing model of the board 
since the 1970s. 
As we heard on the earlier panel, we 
know that the burdens of being a director 
have increased sharply—maybe exponen-
tially—while the capacity of directors has 
increased in only a linear way. We now 
have committees and outside advisors to 
committees. But these extensions of the tra-
ditional board model have clearly proved 
to be inadequate. We know they are inad-
equate because the activists are succeeding 
by getting institutional investors to vote in 
We can look at these questions through the lens 
of structural solutions such as staggered boards, 
special voting requirements, and maybe even dual-
class common stock. Although all of these structural 
solutions may have some benefits in extending the 
time horizons of managements and boards, they all 
face a fundamental problem that I call the “lock-in” 
issue…What I focus on is a corporate governance 
system’s ability to bring about changes of direction 
and control when they become necessary—and not 
on addressing [the] long-term, short-term problem.
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think that Ira would agree with me that 
these are truly “activist” boards—then the 
institutions are probably willing to defer 
to the judgment of that board. Those are 
thickly informed, and deeply engaged, 
boards.
And I also think that these findings have 
implications for how we recruit directors 
of public companies. Some of the PE folks 
I’ve spoken to think that the common prac-
tice of our public companies of recruiting 
CEOs of other companies to be a director 
is completely wrong. Directors who are 
currently CEOs of other companies do 
not have the time to do an adequate job. 
And retired CEOs do not have any clear 
financial incentive. Such former CEOs 
are likely to think to themselves, “I’m now 
being asked to serve on boards because I’ve 
made it; I’m retired, and I’m trading off 
leisure against involvement in this firm. 
The thing I really don’t want is downside 
harm. I don’t want anything embarrassing 
to happen on my watch.” And that kind 
of thinking leads to a focus on compliance 
and not value creation.
By contrast, the directors that PE firms 
put on their boards are mid-career people 
whose personal wealth and future depend 
on how effective they are as directors, how 
much value they deliver, how involved 
they are with the firm, and what capaci-
ties they bring to make the firm function 
better. And notice that the PE model 
also solves some of the diversity issues 
we discussed today just because of the 
demography of the people who are today 
in these middle ranks, given the way busi-
ness schools have changed. 
So anyway, no conclusions yet, but I 
hope that I’ll be able to report more at 
next year’s forum.
thinly informed directors are also at the 
root of the long-run coordination problem 
that Martijn mentioned. For to the extent 
that outside investors recognize that a 
company’s directors have neither the infor-
mation—nor the incentives—to engage 
in genuine strategic review or operational 
oversight, they will be rationally skeptical 
about the payoffs from the company’s stra-
tegic investments and will react sharply to 
evidence of managerial underperformance 
such as missed earnings estimates. Manage-
ments will be on a “short leash” because of 
the governance shortfalls. 
In short, I disagree with Martijn’s char-
acterization of the governance problem 
as a matter of time horizon: short-term 
versus long-term. Sure, there is some of 
that going on. But I think the more fun-
damental problem is with the governance 
capacity of the public firm. Therefore, I’m 
trying to look more closely at the gover-
nance model of the PE firm. 
How do PE firms run the their port-
folio companies? What you see is that 
portfolio companies have small boards 
that consist mostly of PE firm partners 
who are highly focused on the business 
at hand, which is intensive monitoring of 
the performance of their portfolio com-
panies. I have been doing interviews of 
these PE firm partners. And as one of the 
directors told me, I spend my time meet-
ing with the CEO and the CEO’s reports, 
not to tell him or her how to run the busi-
ness, but really to gather information so 
that when we have a board meeting, the 
board focuses on the four or five things 
that the board needs to focus on. 
And the board doesn’t meet just quar-
terly, as in public companies, but every 
two weeks or more frequently if necessary. 
When you have boards like that—and I 
Governance Problems with Passive 
Investors—and the Possibility of 
“Stewardship”?
Bucsescu: We covered a lot of ground there 
and have a few minutes left. I’m going to 
take a question or two from the floor.
Alicia Ogawa: Hi, I’m Alicia Ogawa 
with the Center on Japanese Economy 
and Business at the Columbia Business 
School. I’d like to hear the panel’s view 
on something that Mr. Millstein touched 
on, which is the tension between exercis-
ing effective stewardship and the rise of 
passive funds. In Japan, as you may know, 
the public pension fund is the biggest in 
the world. They control the market, and 
they are invested almost entirely in passive 
vehicles.
So the issue is, how do you get “active” 
passive management, if you will? How do 
you get engagement when most of the 
money is managed passively? The previ-
ous panel talked about engagement with 
shareholders. But my sense is it’s a very 
specific group of shareholders. What are 
the views about the possible effect of the 
growing passive fund interest in active 
stewardship?
 
Cremers: Although passive funds have 
grown a lot, Fidelity and many of the 
other large institutional investors still 
make corporate governance decisions at 
the aggregate level, the family level. They 
have been relatively passive for a long time 
already. My own view is that those pas-
sive funds and institutional investors have 
little at stake. If a fund has 3% of its assets 
invested in Apple and the S&P 500 has 
a 3% weight in Apple and we live in a 
world of relative performance, what does 
the fund have at stake?
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Gordon: I think the stewardship concept—
the idea that one size fits all—is a bad idea. 
The last thing we need is more uniformity 
in the way companies are governed. The 
nice thing that the activists bring to the 
party is their own view, their divergent 
view. And maybe they’re crazy, but the 
point is that it’s an alternative view about 
how this firm ought to be run, presented 
by somebody with a sufficient economic 
stake to be treated seriously. We ought to 
have a governance model in which these 
alternative opinions can be reflected upon 
with respect to this or that specific firm. 
But the claim that companies in general 
are likely to be governed more effectively 
by a set of uniform governance standards 
formulated and imposed by large passive 
institutional investors, each with very 
small ownership stakes in a given com-
pany, is to me highly implausible. 
 As I said earlier, a better alternative 
may be the PE model, which involves 
relational investing. You need a party 
with a very significant economic stake in 
the company’s success, and greater infor-
mation flow between directors and line 
management. That seems to me to be a 
more promising way to improve corpo-
rate performance than forcing some 6,000 
different U.S. companies into a uniform, 
one-size-fits-all model of governance. 
CSR Spending as a Substitute 
for Advertising and a Strategic 
Investment 
Audience: Hi, I’m from Shearman and 
Sterling, London. I have a question for 
Vik about the substitution effect that 
he described in connection with the law 
mandating CSR spending by Indian 
companies. Vik, you said that one of the 
negative effects of CSR spending is less 
spending on advertising. But isn’t CSR 
spending likely a form of advertising? And 
do you think that this kind of advertising 
may be especially effective for companies 
operating in the Third World?
Khanna: My initial reaction to both of 
your questions is yes. I think for a lot of 
firms CSR is simply advertising. But I 
also that think that a lot of the executives, 
especially in the U.S., are increasingly 
thinking of CSR as not just advertising 
but as something that might be part of 
their strategy. People who have studied 
CSR spending by U.S. companies tell me 
that when such companies started adopt-
ing it voluntarily in the 1990s, the stock 
market had a negative reaction. But over 
the last five years, the market reactions to 
voluntary CSR in the U.S. have become 
increasingly positive. And this suggests to 
me that, if you are a Fortune 1,000 com-
pany, having no CSR policy suggests that 
you’re not really thinking through your 
full strategic arsenal.
Now, to answer your broader question 
about how this might benefit companies 
in the Third World, I would say that, 
rather than imposing a pure corporate tax 
on CSR, a better approach would prob-
ably be the voluntary approach that they 
first tried in India—that is, to try to cajole 
the companies into doing it. And I can 
imagine other kinds of policy interven-
tions that might be more like “nudges” 
rather than “hard shoves.” But part of the 
reason for framing the question as I did at 
the end, “Should the U.S. consider this?” 
is that there are already a large number of 
companies doing CSR in the U.S., much 
more than in India. Even in the U.S., 
you have similar concerns about income 
inequality and the possibility of more gain 
sharing. In the U.S., to be sure, the dis-
cussion is likely to proceed from a much 
different perspective, and be informed 
much more by the strategic discussions 
that we’re seeing from U.S. companies. 
But this Indian experiment I have just 
described represents a first step in that 
direction, one that might provide useful 
insights for even U.S. policymakers and 
companies.
Bucsescu: With that, I am afraid we have 
to bring this session to a close. At the Mill-
stein Center, we see great value in bringing 
together business leaders and scholars to 
focus on the right questions and to think 
together through the solutions to the 
issues at hand. That is our purpose with 
the Forum and sessions like those we just 
had. Please join me in thanking our speak-
ers and please keep the dialogue going.
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